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OWENS: One of the fundamental premises in your book rests upon the idea that American 
national identity followed the establishment of its political institutions, as opposed 
to preceding them. You quote historian John Murrin about how our constitutional 
roof was built before our national walls. Could you elaborate a bit on that? 
 
LACORNE: It’s striking that, when it comes to Europe, the nation comes into existence at the 
same time as the state.. Usually the political regime coincides with the building of 
a nation (with the exception of course of Germany and Italy) In the United States, 
there is really a disconnect between the two. That’s what I find fascinating in the 
American experience. Hence the validity of John Murrin’s expression. 
Of course it took over a century—and a civil war—to solidify the nation. It could 
have happened in Europe had, say, the revolutions of 1848 triumphed throughout 
Europe. You would have had political institutions first and then a new kind of 
Republic and a new type of nation in Germany, Italy, and so on and so forth. But 
it didn’t quite happen that way and certainly not in the case of France, Britain or 
Spain. 
 
OWENS: This highlights the importance of national narratives, of how we talk about 
ourselves. What narratives do you most often see in American stories about 
ourselves? How do they compare to the French understandings of America? 
 
LACORNE: When I’m talking about narratives of identity-building, what I mean is narratives 
that are developed by political elites, historians and intellectuals. It’s not 
necessarily a popular or widely accepted narrative. But I think elites matter and 
historians matter, particularly in the way they write or rewrite or reinvent a 
creation story. In the American creation story, the Founding Fathers are key, 
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along with the Declaration of Independence, the Federalist Papers, the 
Constitution. Those are the key instruments that are still a source of the American 
civic culture.. It’s fascinating that in Washington, DC, when you visit the National 
Archives, on Constitution street, you find the original draft of the Constitution 
preserved like Lenin’s corpse used to be preserved in the Kremlin. The case is 
bluish and greenish because it’s such a thick glass, designed to resist a nuclear 
explosion. It’s an important document to protect, but the result is that it’s very 
hard to read the original text because of this greenish glass. But very few societies 
have such a strong sense of their political creation and such a strong attachment to 
a single founding document. The constant references to the Founding Fathers are 
striking and it is remarkable that this continues up to this day. 
Then you have this other creation story, this other narrative, which interestingly 
enough doesn’t respect the historical time frame. This narrative was developed in 
the 19th century in reaction to the failure of the Enlightenment and the French 
Revolution at a time when romantic imagination gave tremendous importance to 
emotions, religious ideas, and the rediscovery of ancient peoples. If you look at 
19th century writers, Whig historians or New England historians for that matter, 
what they are fascinated with are creation stories, the “character” of the people, 
the “volkgeist” or the spirit of a nation—a  spirit that you find in some ancient 
people building up a nation. The model is of course Tacitus, who wrote about the 
Germanic tribes, which were then glorified by Herder, the Schlegel Brothers or 
Fichte. And you have this rediscovery of the Gauls in France, of the Saxons in 
Britain, who are supposed to be more attached to liberty than the Norman 
invaders…. 
If you transfer that kind of romantic imagination to the United States, and if you 
bracket the American Indians and also the first settlers—who happened not to be 
Puritans but adventurers who went to Virginia and had no particular religious 
motivation—you are left with the Puritans. Hence this rewrite of American 
history slightly displaces references to the Founding Fathers—although it does not 
necessarily eliminate them.  It places a tremendous emphasis on the Pilgrims and 
the Puritans. This happens particularly in New England, with people like John 
Quincy Adams, Daniel Webster, and George Bancroft. I think Bancroft is the first 
major historian of the United States, the American equivalent of Michelet, the 
French historian of the French revolution. By the way, the first volume of 
Bancroft’s History of the United States was published in 1834, one year before 
Tocqueville’s Democracy in America. I find a lot of affinities between Bancroft 
and Tocqueville, as if they had read each other’s work. Although Tocqueville 
never refers to Bancroft in his Democracy in America, he clearly knew the great 
American historian and in fact did correspond with him later in his life. There is 
also William Robertson, a very interesting scholar from Britain, a typical product 
of the Scottish Enlightenment, the author of the History of America (1777, 
updated in 1828 in a postumous edition). Robertson is a transition personality 
who disliked the Puritans and thought they were fanatics, but who claimed 
nevertheless, that they brought a decisive “spirit”, a unique Puritan ethic, strongly 
influenced by the democratic tradition of the Levelers. Robertson anticipates 
Bancroft and Max Weber. He should be reread and rediscovered. 
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I’m also interested in the way the French discuss or look at those narratives of 
identity formation. What’s fascinating for me is Enlightenment philosophers like 
Voltaire, but also Locke at the end of the 17th century. Locke in his Letter 
Concerning Toleration is critical of the excesses of Calvinism and denounces the 
burning of Michel Servet in Geneva. Voltaire and many other Enlightenment 
philosophers and the anonymous author of the article “Puritan” in Diderot’s 
Encyclopedia, have a very negative view of Puritanism in general and especially 
New England Puritans. The latter are described as  fanatic, as archaic,  as 
intolerant. In no way are they role models. On the other hand, in Voltaire’s 
Philosophical Letters, there is a tremendous admiration for the Quakers of 
Pennsylvania because the French philospher sees in Quakerism an ideal type, a 
perfect anti-Catholicism. He sees the Quakers as the ideal religion for a non-
religious age -- a religion without sacraments or communion--  and he praises 
William Penn for having created a “government without priests”. This is a good 
example of 18th century French thinking applied to America. 
Also later, visitors from France like Chateaubriand express a very negative view 
of the Puritans. For that matter, if you look at the Founding Fathers, what do they 
say about the New England experience? What do they say about the Puritans? 
Nothing. In the Federalist Papers, you don’t find a single reference to either New 
Jerusalem or the Puritan experience. For them, it’s a distant past that doesn’t 
really matter anymore when they write at the end of the 18th century. Thomas 
Paine is much more relevant than Winthrop. 
 
OWENS: You mentioned that you think elite opinion matters in shaping these narratives, 
and yet there’s a disjunction at times between the elites’ crafting of narratives and 
the actual realities that they are describing, because they are employed in the 
service of nation-building of some sort. Could you say a bit about the sort of 
challenges that arise to these narratives (of secularism or homogeneity, for 
example) over time?  
 
LACORNE: In looking at the transatlantic trade of republican ideas, there is a fascination in 
France for what will become known as the separation of church and state, and the 
United States is clearly ahead of France on this. There is a fascination with 
Jefferson’s Bill for establishing religious freedom in Virginia, which passes 
thanks to Madison’s lobbying. In fact, that bill was fully translated and publicized 
in France in 1786, three years before the Revolution, by Démeunier, who was a 
lawyer and the editor-in-chief of a new post-Diderot encyclopedia, the 
Encyclopédie Méthodique. Démeunier’s Encyclopedia had 14 chapters dedicated 
to the United States alone and a long section on the Virginia debate on religious 
freedom and the disestablishment of the Anglican Church in the state of Virginia. 
So we learn about the separation of church and state even before it is discussed  in 
France, three years before the French Revolution. That’s very important, and of 
course Jefferson was quite influential: he had just been appointed ambassador to 
4 
the Court of Versailles (to be exact he was “Minister Plenipotentiary” to the Court 
of Versailles)  
To answer your question of whether there is a gap between the elite and the 
people. I answer yes, in the sense that Jefferson and most, if not all, of the 
Founding Fathers are deists. The average American is probably not deist or an 
agnostic at the time, and will be less and less sympathetic with deism with the rise 
of the Second Great Revival. Jefferson is the author of the so-called “Jefferson 
Bible,” which takes away everything that has to do with miracles and the 
Resurrection. 
. That’s not what the typical American would do, but that doesn’t mean that 
Jefferson himself is anti-religious or that a secular person is necessarily anti-
religious. Jefferson and Madison, in their fight against the Anglican Church in 
Virginia, are in fact representing or defending smaller churches, like Baptist 
churches, against an overpowering established church. 
So there is in the narrative of secularism a notion of pluralism as well, and that’s 
evident in the Federalist, when Madison is talking about political factions and 
compares them to religious sects. In fact, he gives almost a direct quote from 
Voltaire: You don’t want only one church because then you have tyranny; nor do 
you want two churches, because you may end up with a civil war; but you want 
30 or 50 churches. That’s something that is also in Plutarch and other authors as 
well: the idea that religious pluralism is perfectly compatible with secularism. 
Secularism is all about state neutrality, separation of church and state, but 
certainly not about the disappearance or the destruction of churches. One should 
avoid that confusion. 
 
OWENS: Yet there is an intertwining of these narratives, of course, and somehow they are 
competing. Could you talk about what you see in the contemporary scene, how 
the narratives are referenced today in the 21st century?   
 
LACORNE: There are many ways to look at it, but my claim is that the Enlightenment or 
secular narrative is probably best understood and defended by judges, federal 
judges and justices of the U.S. Supreme Court. That starts with a key decision, the 
Everson decision of 1947, where Jefferson is being rediscovered. Today, you still 
have a number of justices like Souter or Ginsburg or Breyer who believe in a 
separation of church and state and insist that, in the public space in the United 
States, you cannot have a nativity scene or tablets with the 10 Commandments, or 
prayer in school because that’s not compatible with the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment.  
Then on the other side, and more in line with the New Puritan romantic narrative, 
there are very conservative justices like Rehnquist for instance, or today Thomas 
and Scalia, who do not believe in the separation of church and state and who 
would like to abolish it. They object to Jefferson’s notion of a “wall of separation 
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between church and state”. They think it is the “wrong metaphor”—that’s a quote 
from Rehnquist—and are very much opposed to that.  
To further complicate the debate, besides separatists and anti-separatists, you have 
the accommodationists who in fact claim that there are circumstances where you 
can indeed have nativity scenes in the public space or the 10 Commandments in 
the public space, provided that it is next to other religious and secular symbols. If 
you have a Jewish Menorah next to a Christmas tree, then that’s fine. If you have 
a nativity scene and an elephant and a clown, that passes muster because it’s not 
just defending one church or the Christian tradition. Surprisingly, if you look at 
France—which is supposed to be the land of strict, rigid separation of church and 
state—there are a lot of accommodationists as well. One could illustrate this in 
looking at the way we created the French laïcité, but maybe that’s a different 
topic. 
 
OWENS: What are the particular benefits and drawbacks of being a foreigner speaking 
about America? There is a long and distinguished history of French observers 
writing about the US; what does being a part of that tradition mean to your own 
scholarship? 
 
LACORNE: I come from a secular society, but one which still has the reflexes of a Catholic 
country and where the Catholic culture remains very strong, even though the 
practice is very low. Paradoxically, it seems to me that 18th century Frenchmen 
and Americans understood each other better than 21st century Frenchmen and 
Americans, despite the proximity and despite the fact that we often travel to the 
United States. The most striking thing for me is not so much the agreements or 
disagreements on secularism. I think we both understand what it means; we both 
understand what separation of church and state means and state neutrality. In this 
domain, the two societies are very much alike. 
But if you move towards the mid 19th-century—when evangelicalism becomes 
predominant—the French don’t understand it. Even Tocqueville doesn’t 
understand it. Paradoxically, Tocqueville locates the point of departure of 
American democracy in New England with the Puritans—although it’s an abstract 
conception of the Puritans—but when he visits camp meetings in the 1830s, he is 
horrified and he writes about evangelical sects the way Fanny Trollope writes 
about them, which I find very surprising. 
That misunderstanding of evangelicalism still continues today. When a French 
journalist is repelled by all the references to religion in American political 
discourse, he or she blames it on the Puritans! The tendency is to say, oh, well, 
they’re Puritan, they’ve always been Puritan, and that explains the strangeness of 
US politics. There is a complete lack of understanding of the complexity of 
religion in America and of religious pluralism and also a complete lack of 
understanding of the complexity of American politics, where not everyone is a 
member of the Christian Right or a Fundamentalist. 
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So you have strange writings coming out of France. Typical stereotypes: When 
Jean-Paul Sartre and later when Simone de Beauvoir travel to the United States 
right after the Second World War, they are absolutely convinced that they see 
Puritans all over the place, even among students—to the point of claiming that 
they behave puritanically in the sexual act. More recently, Bernard-Henri Levy 
displayed the same stereotypical conception. Retracing Tocqueville’s travel in 
American Vertigo (published in 2006), he visits a bordello in Nevada (which is 
not exactly what Tocqueville would have done!) and opines that he is witnessing 
Puritanism at work. 
So today we have this interesting debate between Rick Perry and Mitt Romney 
about the Mormon church that adds confusion to confusion, because we know 
nothing about Mormonism in France and it appears to be a very bizarre religion. 
Again, we are going to claim that Americans are crazy when in fact they’re not; 
it’s religious pluralism at its best and at its worst. It’s true that there is a kind of 
underground religious war in American primaries, but this may have to do with 
the calendar of the primaries and caucuses. Iowa and South Carolina are two 
states where the evangelical vote matters a great deal. Six months from now, we 
may not talk about religion any more. In France we’re having a first experience 
with primaries. The Socialist party is the first French party which has opted for a 
primary system to nominate its presidential candidate. But it is a very different 
system: a national primary with a short two week campaign: not enough time to 
talk about secularism or religious issues….  
 
OWENS: So are we so different, the French and Americans? 
 
LACORNE: Yes and no. I would say, in many ways, you may be more strictly separatists than 
we are. A very simple example is that it’s true that we French do not ban the cross 
or tablets of the 10 Commandments in the public space and how could we? The 
public space is so colonized by religious symbols and structures that have been 
present as far back as the Middle Ages that it would be absurd and 
counterproductive to ban crosses or religious monuments from the French public 
square. But we do ban the veil and we do ban the burqa. We do it when we face 
unfamiliar religions and practices that are disturbing for some of us. But in many 
ways you Americans are more separatist than we are, in the sense that you do not 
finance private religious schools with the limited exception of vouchers. We do. 
Since 1959, up to 80% of the cost of a religious education in France is supported 
by the state. So in many ways, there is more entanglement of church and state in 
France than in the United States, if you consider the question of education and 
private schools. 
 
OWENS:  Thank you very much. 
 
-End- 
